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Why Has the U.S. Divorce Rate Doubled Within the Decade?
This paper seeks to explain the recent rise in U.S. divorce
rates using an economic framework. Annual time series data from
1920 to 1974 are used in the empirical analysis. The estimated
equation tracks the actual series quite well. Itattributes the
recent increase in divorce to improved contraceptive technology,
reduced average duration of marriage (resulting from the age dis—
tribution of the population) and income growth. Projections sug-
gest a flattening of the divorce rate series in the near future.
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The motivation for this paper is to understand the causes of the
recent rise in the U.S. divorce rate. Figure 1 shows the time series of
annual divorce rates (number of divorces per 1000 married women age 15 and
over) since 1920 with decennial estimates back to 1890. The series ex-
hibits an upward trend with three substantial disruptions: a short episode
during the Great Depression, a sharp rise during and immediately following
World War II, and an extended upswing in the most recent seven years. One
can readily offer single ad hoc explanations for the first two of
these disruptions from the long—term trend, but the cause of the current
rise is less apparent. This recent upswing is exceptional by historical
standards but is not unique to the U.S. The recent doubling of the U.S.
divorce rate represents a major demographic phenomenon for which no ex-
planation and little analysis has yet appeared. As a divorce is in some
respects analogous to a job separation or to a dissolution of any long—
term contract, an economic perspective is employed in a demographic con-
text in seeking an explanation for the rise in divorce.
I.Analytical Issues
Recent economic analyses of marriage and cross—sectional divorce
provide the context for this multivariate analysis of the U.S. aggregate
divorce rate.1 Marriages may be made in heaven but are assumed to be
negotiated in competitive markets in which each partner settles for the
best he or she can do, given the available choices which are limited by
the competition of others and the costs involved in searching more thor-
oughly. Divorces result when those negotiated marriage contracts appear
no longer to represent the expected best alternative marital circumstance













































































































































































































































The economic literature on marriage suggests at least three forces
which affect the gains from a marriage; the smaller those gains the greater
the likelihood of divorce.(1) The level of the family's income (in par-
ticular the income of the primary worker) is expected to be negatively
related to divorce, as the marriage gains are positively related to the
level of resources.(2) The relative wage rate of the secondary worker,
or the labor force attachment of the secondary worker, is expected to be
positively related to divorce, as the gains from specialization within the
marriage decline with increases in the secondary worker's labor market
attachment.(3) The similarity between spouses in traits or character-
istics used jointly in marital activities is expected to be negatively
related to divorce, as these traits are technical complements in non—
market production and are thus positively related to the gains from
marriage.
Cross—sectional divorce studies tend to confirm all three of these
forces,2 and introduce two other forces which influence divorce.(4) Un-
expected events are maritally destabilizing (e.g., unexpectedly high or
low income, severe episodes of unemployment, fertility impairment, and
health changes appear to increase the likelihood of divorce). (5) If we
conceive of family—produced capital jointly owned by the spouses and
having greater value in the marriage in which it is produced than else-
where ——marital—specificcapital ——thenthe stock of such capital at any
duration of marriage will be negatively related to the probability of
divorce, with causation running in both directions. Own—children are the
most prevalent example of such capital.
The analogue to job separation is very clear here. The first three
forces are related to the general adequacy of the match; the better that—3—
matching the less likely any random perturbation will render that marriage
(or that job) no longer desirable. The fourth implies that for any given
quality of the match, the bigger a random shock to the system the more
likely the match will no longer be desirable. The fifth factor is com-
parable to job—specific human capital that represents an additional cap-
ital loss from dissolving the match.
The application of many of these cross—sectional results to aggregate
time series is quite straightforward. Increases in women's labor force
participation rates, unanticipated increases in unemployment rates, de-
creases in number of children in the family, and any phenomenon which
might result in less well—matched couples should increase the aggregate
divorce rate.3 In the case of other variables, notably those which oper-
ate through the marriage market, analytical modifications are required in
dealing with aggregate time series data.
Consider the effect of males' income on the gain from marriage. In
the cross section an increase in one man's income has two effects on his
expected gains from marriage: it raises the gain from marriage to any
partner via complementarity of his income with other resources and it
increases his relative attractiveness in the marriage market, which im-
proves his chances of securing a relatively better mate. In the aggregate,
however, only the first of these two forces operates; if all men's incomes
rise there is no improvement in the relative attractiveness of any one
man, hence no resorting. Since the differential sorting effect by income
is not present in the aggregate time series, the gains from marriage should
not rise with income as much in aggregate time series as in the disaggre-
gate cross section data. Hence the negative effect of husbands' income
on divorce in the cross section should be weaker in the time series.—4—
There are two other reasons the effect of husbands' income may not
be strongly negatively related to the likelihood of divorce In aggregate
time series data. First, cross sectional findings suggest the relation-
ship between income and the likelihood of divorce is nonlinear ——steeply
negative at low Income levels, rather flat at middle income levels and
even positive at very high income levels [see Becker, Landes, Michael
(1977)]. As changes in aggregate time series income reflect changes in
average income a relatively weak relationship with divorce may be expected.
Second, to the extent time series income fluctuations reflect transitory
income, they may represent little or no impact on the expected gains from
marriage.
Another aggregation issue involves the fact that the likelihood of
divorce typically declines with duration of marriage. There is consider-
able evidence from cross—sectional studies that various factors such as
age at marriage affect divorce rates differently at different durations
of marriage. In the cross section one can remove the complicating influence
of duration by decomposition. In time series data one has only the mean or
median marriage duration for standardization and it may be that critical
interactions involve other moments of the distribution of marriage dura-
tion.
In addition to differences between the cross section and the time
series due to aggregation there are, of course, factors which change
over time that are fixed in the cross section. One such factor is business
cycle fluctuations encompassed in such variables as income and unemploy-
ment as discussed above. A second additional time series factor is war.
In a time series study of divorce it seems inappropriate to omit war years,
as is frequently done In other time series analyses. This variable, say—5—
measured as the percent of adults in military service, surely merits atten—
J
tionin the past fifty—year perspective and perhaps in the past twenty
years as well. Admittedly, the emphasis on this phenomenon is prompted
by the obvious empirical relationship between the divorce rate and the war
years, so the purity of hypothesis testing in this regard is questionable.
However, it seems clear on a priori grounds that a military manpower
variable should be negatively related to the gains from the current
marriage for at least four reasons. (1) Many marriages during wartime are
initiated relatively quickly prior to entering service (perhaps prompted
by military pay supplements for spouses) or relatively quickly in order to
avoid service as in the 1960's. These marriages which resulted from less
marital search presumably result in less well—matched pairs and hence in
relatively low gains from marriage; thus they should exhibit higher rates
of divorce. (2) Among existing marriages, wartime military service is
typically an unexpected event, and such events are generally maritally de-
stabilizing. (3) The separation of spouses itself is maritally destabil-
izing as associations weaken and other ties are more likely to form ——
greaterdepreciation of and less new investment in spouse—specific capital
lowers the capital loss involved in divorce. (4) The imposed mobility and
the increase in the size and the sex imbalance in the pooi of unmarried
persons resulting from war tend to raise the probability that a relatively
attractive mate might be encountered, which further raises the probability
of divorce.
An additional time series influence is technological change, of which
the most important aspect in the present context is technological change
in fertility control. The oral contraceptive, first patented in 1955 and
first marketed in the U.S. in 1960, followed by the medical acceptance of—6—
the IUD after l962 represented an abrupt and sizable change in the
efficacy of available contraception. Two quite different observations
provide convincing evidence that couples faced a very different circum-
stance related to fertility control in the post—pill era than they faced
prior to 1960. First, estimates of the actual use—effectiveness of con-
traceptive techniques imply huge differences between the pill—IUD technol-
ogy and the pre—pill methods. Briefly, the probability of a pregnancy in
ten years when using rhythm, foam or jelly, condom or diaphragm, hiD, or
pill is .98, .88, .77, .22, and .09 respectively.5
Second, evidence on actual fertility outcomes, when measured by, say,
the conditional probability of a birth for women with six children at a
given age showed essentially no change from 1930 to 1960 despite the large
fluctuation in actual fertility over this period. But this measure of
fertility plummeted in the 'years following l96 (see Table 1). Likewise,
Sanderson's extensive study of birth probabilities isolated year—specific
effects (removing, cohort and age effects). For higher—order births, the
year effect was essentially nonexistent until 1960 after which the year
effect was very pronounced (again, see Table 1). The use—effectiveness
data and these year—specific fertility indicators for high—order births
imply that a major change in fertility control occurred in the 1960's.
These changes in contraceptive technology in the early 1960's were
followed by further medical improvements in fertility control through
changes in male and female sterilization procedures and by legal changes
governing elective abortions. Students of contraceptive behavior argue
convincingly that the past fifteen years deserve to be considered a period
of "contraceptive revolution" [see Westoff and Ryder (1977)]. Given that
such a revolution has taken place, why should it be expected to affect the-6A-
Table 1.Indexes of birth probabilities for women with six children, by
age and year; and Sanderson's index of the current—year component
______forthe birth probability for women with six children. (1960=1.00)
Year Birth Probability Index Sanderson's Index of
for Women Aged: Current Year Component
30—34 35—39 _________________________
(1) (2) (3)
1930 1.06 1.16 0.99
1935 1.00 1.05 0.98
1940 1.00 0.94 0.98
1945 1.12 1.06 na
1950 1.01 0.99 0.93
1955 1.05 1.06 1.01
1960 1.00 1.00 1.00
1965 0.71 0.70 0.64
1970 0.46 0.42 (1966 =0.46)
1973 0.34 0.29 na
Source: Cols. (1), (2) from Table 9B, Heuser (1976); Col.(3) from
Figure 41, page 183, Sanderson (1974); Sanderson's series stops
in 1966 and excludes the war years.
Table 2. Probability of Divorce in five—year marriage duration intervals
by number of young children present at the beginning of each
interval; white women
5—10 Years of 10—15 Year of
Marriage Marriage*
Overall Probability of Divorce
in the five—year period: 3.92% 3.55%
If Zero Children under 6
at the beginning of the interval: 6.01 4.69
If One Child under 6
at the beginning of the interval: 4.01 2.96
If Two Children under 6
at the beginning of the interval: 2.82 1.97
*Estimated assuming 1.0 older child in the family. The regression holds
constant wife's age, age at marriage, education, and premarital pregnancy
status.
Source: Becker—Landes—Mjchael (1977) based on 1967 SEO data.—7—
divorce rate? Three reasons are suggested here, and because of the
importance of this factor in the empirical estimation below, these three
reasons are discussed at length. First, improved fertility control
lowers actual fertility which tends to raise the rate of divorce.6 In
cross—sectional studies of divorce there is statistical evidence of the
commonly held belief that the presence of children, In particular young
7 children, inhibits divorce.Table 2 shows the implied partial effects
of the first and second young child on the divorce probability over two
successive five years of marriage in one recent study. The presence of
a young child in the household is estimated to lower the likelihood of
divorce in these intervals by roughly 30 percent; a reduction from two to
one child is associated with a roughly 50 percent rise in the likelihood
of divorce.
While the decline in fertility since 1960 cannot be attributed exclu-
sively to improved contraception, surely some part of the decline is re-
lated to the introduction of the pill and the medical acceptance of the IUD.
Despite reservations expressed at earlier dates [e.g., Ryder (1972) pp. 237—
239], Westoff and Ryder (1977) conclude on the basis of their extensive
analysis of contraception and fertility behavior through the l960!s that:
"the entire decline in births within marriage across the decade of the
1960's can be attributed to the improvement In the control of fertility"
(p. 340) which "is no doubt attributable in large measure to the advent—8—
and wide diffusion of a new, highly effective birth control technology,
particularly the pill and the intrauterine devicet' (p. 308). The total
marital fertility rate in the U.S. fell from 1961 to 1974 from 3.42 children
per married woman to 1.63, a decline of 1.79 children [see Gibson (1976)].
If, say, sixty percent of that reduction is attributable to the changed
contraceptive technology, that one fewer child may have resulted in a sub-
stantially higher likelihood of divorce, if the findings characterized in
Table 2 are indicative of that effect.
A second reason contraceptive technology may affect divorce behavior
involves a more indirect but not necessarily less powerful channel of
influence: it reduces uncertainty about subsequent fertility, which in
turn alters household investment behavior in a manner which raises the like—
lihood of divorce. With imperfect fertility control, young couples face
considerable uncertainty about their subsequent fertility. The amount of
this uncertainty is not trivial and its relation to contraceptive behavior
can be illustrated with findings from a study using the 1965 National Fer-
tility Survey. Partitioning the sample of women into groups deemed to have
had similar fertility intentions, women who used relatively effective con-
traception had a much smaller likelihood of experiencing excessive fertility
than women who used relatively poor, or no, contraception (Table 3 provides
some details on the samples and fertility outcomes). Viewing the observed
actual fertility by the 24th year of marriage as an indication of the ex
ante risk of excess fertility faced by these women, those who used "good"
contraception (primarily condom and diaphragm in the time intervals in
question) had less than half as high a likelihood of having five or more
children than did those who used "poor" contraception, and less than one—
third as high a likelihood than did those women who used no contraception-8A-
Table 3. Fertility outcomes by contraceptive strategies for white
non—Catholic women
A. Estimated probabilities of selected fertility outcomes for
women married 20—24 years and estimated to have "wanted"
three children, by contraceptive strategy
Contraception used Estimated probability Index
in first birth of having five or more of un—
interval children certainty
good contraception 4.4% 1.00
poor contraception 10,1 2.30
no contraception 14.1 3.20
B. Actual percentage of women in each cell who had five or
more children, for women 35—44, for cells defined by
women's education level and contraceptive strategy
Contraception used
Women s Education in first birth
interval 9—11 years 12 years 13 years
good contraception 13.9% 10.3 6.5
poor contraception 27.5 14.9 11.7
no contraception 26.7 14.3 11.1
Source: Derived from Michael and Willis (1976), based on 1965 NFS
data. Probabilities obtained as follows: the mean pand
standard deviation a of actual number of live births was
computed for each of three groups of women distinguished
by the contraceptive technique used in their first birth
interval (good =condomor diaphragm; poor =allother
techniques; none =notechnique). The probabilities were
calculated for each group for a standard normal distribu-
tion, using (x—p)/cy with x =5.
Index of Uncertainty is simply the probability in row (2)
or (3) relative to that for "good contraception" users.—9—
(some of whom were and most of whom thought themselves subfecund).
There is both considerable variation by contraceptive technique in the un-
certainty couples face, and there is substantial uncertainty faced by
couples using even the best available pre—pill technology. Of course, one
cannot yet have a 24—year history of fertility outcomes for pill—IUD users,
but judging from the differential use—effectiveness of these techniques, the
comparable chance of having more than five children when using the pill
should fall practically to zero.
This reduction in uncertainty about subsequent fertility faced by a
young couple in their 20's or 30's can be expected to influence decisions
about their consumption and savings behavior, the wife's labor market
attachment, and for some the attractiveness of being married per Se. Con-
sider two 30—year—old women with no additional children desired. If faced
with a probability of .75 or higher of another pregnancy within the next
ten years (a reasonable expectation using a pre—pill technology), the
attractiveness of making a labor market career investment might appear con-
siderably less than if the accurate expectation was no pregnancy. There
is considerable evidence that the presence of young children lowers the
likelihood of married women being in the labor market [e.g., Heckman,
Willis (1977) estimate the effect per child to be about —.09 on a mean
of 0.43 for a 1967 sample], and discussions of on—the—job investments in
skills by women frequently emphasize that these investments are often
postponed until childbearing is completed as skills depreciate relatively
rapidly when the woman is outside the labor force [see Mincer, Polachek
(1974)]. Faced with uncertainty about future fertility, a woman may
delay her anticipated labor market investment. That delay might well be
accompanied by other activities which would increase her skill in non——10—
labor—market activities, subsequently decreasing the attractiveness of
marital dissolution and also of a market career altogether. Perhaps more
broadly than the change in labor market orientation of women, couples may
respond to uncertain future fertility by orienting their plans and present
activities in ways that tend to strengthen their marriage by increasing
the capital losses from dissolution. Although no evidence is adduced
linking the reduced uncertainty about future fertility to investment be-
havior, the logic that underlies those investments surely implies that the
effectis to be expected.8
Anadditionalimpact ofthis uncertainty about subsequent fertility
relates to the decision to be married or unmarried. It has been argued
[Becker (1974)] that one of the important production efficiencies which
generates a demand for marriage is the more basic demand for bearing and
rearing own—children. 1n a world of quite imperfect fertility control,
the force of this argument might be changed: given a desire to be sex-
ually active, an inevitable consequence is some substantial risk of a birth
which implies a likelihood of marriage if the birth is to be legitimized.
If, with improved contraception, sexual activity no longer need involve a
substantial risk of birth, then the derived demand for marriage would be
based on the smaller demand for "desired" or "wanted" children rather
than on the demand for "actual" (wanted and unwanted) fertility. Thus,
the gains from marriage per se may have been reduced appreciably with the
recent fertility control technology changes, especially for persons who
H wantedno children.
The third reason improved contraceptive technology may encourage
divorce is that it weakens an important restriction on extramarital sexual
activity. By lowering the risk of conception, the cost of non—marital sex—11—
is reduced which presumably raises the quantity demanded, thus increasing
extra—marital search that in turn raises the probability of encountering
a preferred mate. Evidence here too is difficult to obtain, but Ryder and
Westoff show that within marriage "coital frequency is positively associ-
ated with the effectiveness of contraception" [Westoff and Ryder (1977),
p. 67], for presumably the same reasons.
The change in fertility control technology in the 1960's has another
feature which makes it an attractive variable to use in studying time
series divorce. The technological change can be considered exogenous;
it was introduced before the rise in divorce began and had its roots in
medical innovations for which patents were first applied as early as 1952.
It is often the case that a set of variables moves together over time in
a consistent manner, as in the past fifteen years the decline in fertility,
growth in women's labor force participation and growth. in divorce rates
have done. But it is not an easy matter to identify the causally prior
force which has influenced such series. Surely there is much simulta-
neous causation among fertility, women's labor force rates and divorce
rates in recent years but we would like to know which of these or what
other influences prompted the changes which have taken place. While
technological innovations may themselves be induced by demand considera-
tions and perhaps the contraceptive technological changes in the late
1960's were responding to social forces, It seems reasonable to argue that
the pill—IIJD technology was in no meaningful sense caused by the divorce
rate.
Another factor often discussed as an important influence on the
divorce rate in recent years is the change in the legal costs (broadly
defined) of divorce. Surely the costs affect the demand and as discussed—12—
below these costs have fallen in many states in the U.S. within
the past decade. What is far less clear is whether it is appropriate in
trying to explain the rise in divorce to use the easing of divorce laws as
an exogenous influence. In other areas of law, such as minimum schooling
legislation, studies have indicated that changes in laws do not
alter behavior but are, rather, responses to and codification of be—
havioral changes [see, e.g., Landes, Solmon (1972)1. So, without a simul-
taneous system in which these law changes were themselves predicted, it
seems inappropriate to place much weight on these changes in divorce laws
in explaining the recent rise in divorce.
One final potentially important influence on time series divorce
results from a dynamic relation with the series itself. A general rise
in the divorce rate influences subsequent years' divorce rates in several
ways: (1) by creating a greater pool of more readily available potential
mates which probably lowers the expected (net) gain from the current
marriage, thus inducing increased divorce; (2) by increasing the expecta-
tion of divorce which reduces incentives to invest in marital—specific
capital, which lowers the losses incurred by divorce (i.e., the expecta-
tion is self—fulfilling); (3) by ultimately raising the proportion of all
marriages which are second and third marriages, in which the divorce rate
is, typically, higher [see McCarthy (1977)].
II. 1920—1974 Time Series Analysis
The preceding section discusses numerous factors expected to influence
the divorce rate over time. The regression analysis reported in this
section and in the appendix focuses on the aggregate annual time series
of divorce rates since 1920, with a few appendix regressions restricted
to the post—war period. The estimation involves a single reduced form—l 3—
equation and thus several factors which are considered simultaneously
determined with the divorce rate are not included directly in the equations
(some are reported in the appendix for comparison). Five principal vari-
ables are used in the regressions: income (Y), for which cross section
results show strong negative coefficients but as discussed above, this
negative effect should be much weaker in the time series; unemployment
'(U) for which the positive cross section effect might also be somewhat
weaker; a measure of marriage duration (MD) used to standardize for this
important demographic dimension of divorce rates ——asmeasured MD is
inversely related to the median duration of marriage and thus should be
positively correlated with the divorce rate; a measure of military man-
power (CI) which should be positively related to the divorce rate; and one
of two measures of contraceptive technology, CT, a diffusion measure
based on estimated adoption of the pill and IUD in the U.S., or DF, a
diffusion measure based on a logistic diffusion curve. Another variable
with which experimentation was performed with little success is a crude
measure of an Easterlin relative income concept [see Easterlin (1973)],
REL(Y), defined here as the ratio of real per capital income in year t to
real per capita income in year t—15. The idea here is to capture the
economic circumstances of an individual in year t (think of, say, a 28—
year—old) relative to the economic circumstances that individual experienced
in his or her formative years, taken to be about fifteen years before (say,
at age 13). The hypothesis is that the better the person's current circum-
stance relative to his or her childhood circumstance, the higher his rela-
tive income and the lower his likelihood ofdivorce)0
The variables used in the regression analysIs for the period 1920—1974
were annual observations. Their sources and measurement details are listed )
inappendix Table A—i. Briefly, they are:—14--
DR: divorce rate: the number of divorces per 1000 married women age
15 (u= 10.1;a =3.1;range 6.1 —19.3)
Y: income: personable disposable income per capita in 1967 dollars
(p =$1783;a =$603;range $934 —3045)
REL(Y): relative income: for year t the ratio of real personal disposable
income per capita in year t to the real PDI per capita in year
t —15(p =1.27;a =0.28;range 0.54 —1.92)
U: unemployment: percent of civilian labor force unemployed (year
averages) (p =7.1;a =6.1;range 1.2 —24.9)
MD: marriage duration: for year t, the ratio of the total number of
marriages in years t, t—l, t—2, to the total number of marriages
in years t, c—i, ...,t—14.This ratio should be inversely re-
lated to the median duration of marriage.
(p= 21.5;a =2.2;range 18.0 —25.4)
GI: military manpower: percent of the population age18 which is
in the military (p =2.1;a =2.5;range 0.3 —12.3)
CT: contraceptive technology: estimate of the percent of married
spouse—present women who are using an oral contraceptive or IUD
(p =3.4;a =9.2;range 0 —35)
DF: technology diffusion: an index intended to reflect the diffusion
of changed contraceptive technology in the 1960's. The index
reaches 98.5% saturation in 15 years (p =4.3;a =13.4;range
0 —68.6)
As the decision to divorce precedes the final issuing of a divorce
decree by many months,11 it is assumed that a two—year lag on most exogenous
variables would be appropriate. The contraceptive technology variable CT
or DF is the only one for which a longer lag seemed appropriate. Whether
the channel of influence of this factor is through a reduction in actual
fertility, a reduction in uncertainty about subsequent fertility, or a re-
percussion of a reduced cost of extra—marital sex, a lag between initial
adoption and the decision to divorce of, say, three years seemed reason-
able, a priori, so a total lag of five years for this variable is used.
Clearly, the proper lag structure may differ from variable to variable, and
the entire impact may not be transmitted to the divorce rate in any single—15—
year. Experimenting with distributed lags and alternative single—period
lags has not been done, however.
Table 4 reports results from five regressions estimated by a two—
stage process employing the "Durbin—procedure" for removing the autore-
gressive structure from the residuals.12 Regarding the directions of
effects, marriage duration, military manpower and contraceptive technology
have the expected, and reasonably strong, positive effects on the divorce
rate. Unemployment has a substantial positive effect, as in the cross
section (although this effect does not accord with one's casual impression
from the drop in divorce in the early. 1930's). The most puzzling result
in these regressions is the persistently positive effect of income.
While the strong negative effect from the cross section was not expected,
the significant positive effect of income on divorce has not been ex-
plained. My explanation is this: measured income (Y) is capturing in part
the positive effect on divorce of the growth in women's labor force parti-
cipation. To investigate this possibility, time series regressions using
women's labor force participation rates (LF) and men's income (MEN(Y)),
both available only in the post—war period, were run (see appendix Table
A—4). The labor force variable did appear to weaken the significance of
the positive income (Y) effect although LF itself never approached sig-
nificance, while MEN(Y) had a much weaker (insignificant) effect when used
in place of Y and its effect was further weakened by including LF, which
supports the view that Y's significant positive effect is reflecting, in
part at least, the rise in LFPR of women. The REL(Y) variable is not
useful in these regressions (see Table 4). Preston and McDonald (1976)


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tials but both the measure of relative income used here and the analysis
of period instead of cohort divorces helps explain its poor showing in
these regressions.
Figure 2 plots the predicted series (from equation (3), Table 4) together
with the actual divorce rate series; the predicted series mirrors the actual
series quite well.13 In order to track through time the impact on the
divorce rate of the various explanatory variables, Table 5 indicates the
decade—by—decade changes attributable to each variable, based again on eq.
(3) in Table 4. Considering income and unemployment together as the in-
fluence of the economy, this influence contributed on the order of magni-
tude of two—thirds of a percentage point per decade to the growth in
divorce in three of the five decades. In the most recent decade the effect
of the economy was to raise the divorce rate by about three times its
ordinary decade effect.
The military manpower variable contributes to the growth in divorce
rates in these decade changes through the 1940's and 1950's only. The ex-
ceptional role played by this variable in the mid—l940's is indicated by
the four—year period effects shown parenthetically in Table 5. (In the
post—war regressions, the military manpower variable was invariably statis-
tically insignificant.) The marriage duration variable appears to have an
important Influence on the decade changes throughout this half century.
Marriage duration lengthened over time from about 1920 through 1933,
shortened during the remainder of the 1930's, was low throughout and
immediately after World War II, lengthened thereafter until about 1960,
then shortened again. Thus the changes in the duration of marriages tended










































































































































































































Table 5. Decade—by—decade effects of explanatory variables on the )
divorcerate, as estimated by equation (3), Table 4
Decade Total
1922—32 1932—42 1942—52 (1942—46) 1952—62 1962—72 1922—72
Income (Y): .203 .3431.177 (1.432) .6511.9204.294
Unemployment (U): .321 .541—.852 (—1.228) .018—.055—.027
Military man— —.105 .097 .483 (6.088) .397 .073 .945
power (GI):






Total predicted—0.419 1.972 —0.077 (6.435)0.188 7.9789.642
change:
Actual change: —0.5 4.0 0.0 (7.8) —0.7 7.6 10.4—17—
1950's, and tended to raise the period—specific divorce rates during the
1930's and from 1960 to the present.
The effect of the contraceptive technology proxy in the most recent
decade is very strong when measured by either DF or CT.[The comparable
1962—1972 effects of CT from regressions (1), (2), and (4) ofTable4 are:
4.477, 5.063, and 4.469 respectively.] The lengthy discussion in the pre-
ceding section offers an explanation for this strong effect.
The final column of Table 5 shows each variable's half century ef-
fect. While marriage duration had a relatively strong effect on the divorce
rate in each of the decades considered, it, like unemployment, is cyclical
so its influence on the fifty—year trend in the divorce rate is substan-
tially smaller relative to other variables. Over the fifty—year period,
the growth in income appears to be a principal factor In the growth in
divorce, contributing 4.3 percentage points or about 45 percent of the
"explained" increase. Although both military manpower and marriage duration
also contribute 0.9 and 0.7 percentage points, these figures are quite
sensitive to the particular fifty—year period chosen for the comparison)4
Unemployment has no significant influence over the fifty years. The con-
traceptive technology variable, measured as either DF or CT, does have a
pronounced effect through its impact in the recent decade.
III. Further Explorations
Divorce Laws. Regarding the easing of legal barriers to divorce,
there is no disputing the magnitude of changes in laws governing divorce
in certain states such as California, Iowa, Florida, and Michigan with the
advent of no—fault dissolutions in 1970—71. It is, however, difficult to
quantify In general the easing of divorce laws over time.15 Moreover, as—18—
discussed above, there is a more fundamental question of whether changes
in laws can legitimately be viewed as an exogenous social force.
While legal ease of divorce was not incorporated in the time series
regressions above for both of these reasons, Figure 3 provides some crude
indication of the relation between the rise in divorce and the statutory
changes in divorce laws in several states. The figure simply shows the
annual time series since 1960 of divorce rates for specific states.16
There was only one notable change in the divorce laws during the 1960's:
New York eased its law moderately in 1966. The new no—fault dissolution
law which went into effect January 1970 in California marked the beginning
of a two—year period in which several states ——includingIowa, Florida,
Michigan, Oregon, Colorado, and Vermont ——adoptedno—fault [see Wheeler
(1974)]. In most of these states in which law changes have occurred,
appreciable increases in divorce rates are observed subsequently ——cer-
tainly in New York and California and perhaps Iowa and Florida as well.
Whether the higher rates of divorce persist several years after the easing
of the law is not clear ——compareNew York (where it appears to do so)
with California (where the effect appears to be temporary).17
Yet, while we observe increases after the enactment of new, easier
divorce laws, we also observe considerable increases in divorce rates
prior to the passage of those laws, and contemporaneous increases in states
in which no law change took place. The figure does not lend support to
the argument that the divorce law changes caused the rise in divorce rates
which began in the 1960's. In almost every state investigated the rise in
divorce began several yearsbefore the law was changed. Whether the change
in laws subsequently altered divorce behavior or altered only its timing,
or in some states had no effect, is far less clear. Whatever forces causedFigure 3. Annual Divorce
1960 to 1974
Rates for Selected St.3tes,





















the rise in divorce rates probably also contributed pressure, at least
indirectly, on legislators to codify in the form of easier divorce laws
a more tolerant social attitude toward divorce.
International Comparison. Additional perspective on the rise in U.S.
divorce rates in the past decade can be obtained by a comparison of inter-
national crude divorce rates (divorces per 1000 population). For an arbi-
trarily selected set of countries, Figure 4 reveals the following pattern:
North American and European countries appear to have experienced a marked
and sustained rise in divorce rates beginning in the mid—1960's; the rest
of the world, generally speaking, did not. This paper does not provide an
analysis of these data but several relevant points can be observed from the
figure itself:(1) The marked rise in the U.S. divorce rate in the mid—
1960's is not an isolated, national phenomenon. Thus the cause of that
rise probably is not a purely domestic force such as a change in laws.
(2) The impact of World War II is evident in practically every country and
even the more modest change in Sweden during the 1940's confirms this
interpretation of the war—related increase in divorce. (3) There appears
from this casual evidence to be a relationship between the recent rise in
divorce and the adoption of the oral contraceptive: the rise in divorce
has been far less dramatic in predominately Catholic countries such as
Guatemala and France, in middle—Eastern countries, and in highly developed
countries such as Japan in which more traditional forms of contraception
are still the prevalent mode (in Japan the IUD and pill had not been
officially approved for use by 1971). A multitude of additional factors
may need be accounted for in a more thorough international study, but Fig-
ure 4 appears to lend support to this contention that in countries where the
new modes of contraception have not been adopted the rise in divorce rates
in recent years has been much less pronounced.-1 9A-
Figure 4. Time Series of Crude Divorce Rates for Arbitrarily Selected























Demographic Standardization. To determine if the recent growth in the
U.S. divorce rate might have been the result of demographic shifts toward
population groups which traditionally have high divorce rates, several
demographic standardizations were performed. Between 1960 and 1970 estimates
of age—specific divorce rates suggest that no more than 20 percent of the
decade change in divorce is attributable to changes in the age composition
of the population and much of the increase (about 40 percent) is due to
increase in the divorce rates of women aged 20—29 [see Michael (1977)].
The attribution of the growth in divorce to younger couples is cdnsistent
with the contention that the contraceptive revolution of the 1960's is a
primary cause of that growth, for the impact of the improved fertility
control should be strongest on women with more remaining years of fertility
risk.
Divorce rates are generally observed to be higher in second than in
first marriages.18 A shift in the proportion of all U.S. marriages which
are second (or higher order) marriages would tend to raise the observed
overall divorce rate, but no such shift is evident for the period from 1950
to 1970.19 So there is no ground for supposing the observed rise in divorce
between 1960 and 1970 is attributable to a shift toward second marriages.
Likewise, it has long been known that divorce rates differ geograph-
ically in the U.S. in a curious manner: they rise rather continually from
the Atlantic coast to the Pacific coast. Without discussing the reasons for
this pattern here, it would be important to know if the recent rise in
divorce is a geographically local phenomenon or if much of the rise could
be attributed to population shifts among regions. The answer here too
appears to be no. Vital Statistics data show a substantial rise In the
divorce rate between 1960 and 1970 in every division of the country.—21—
IV.Summaryand Prognosis
The recent increase in divorce rates in the U.S. appears to be attrib-
utable disproportionately to couples in their twenties; their high and
rapidly growing divorce rate has been reinforced by their rising proportion
in the married population. The largest age cohorts today (1977) are those
aged 16—20 and as these cohorts marry there should be continued upward
pressure on the aggregate divorce rate. The rising age at first marriage
has offset this tendency somewhat, but the basic arithmetic of the aging
of baby—boom cohorts has had and will continue to have a significant
impact on the aggregate divorce rate ——in1960 there were one—third as
many women in their 20's as there were women in their 30's, 40's, and 50's;
by 1975 there were one—half as many women in their 20's!
Regarding the forces that have contributed to the change in divorce
behavior over the past fifteen years, the growth in the economy, measured
in terms of real per capita income, appears from Table 5 to have had a sub-
stantial influence explaining perhaps 25 percent of the growth in divorce
rates between 1962 and 1972. Real growth in the economy over the next
decade should continue upward pressure on the divorce rate. The reconcil-
iation of considerable cross—sectional evidence of a negative relationship
between income and divorce and the observed positive relationship in the
aggregate time series deserves further study. The discussion in Section
II explains why a negative relationship is not expected in the time series,
but does not predict a positive relationship. Perhaps the explanation is
that variety Is a luxury in the context of interpersonal relations as it is
observed to be in diets, work routines, etc. But perhaps the explanation
is that aggregate income is in part reflecting the positive effect on
divorce of the rising labor force participation of women, as discussed in
Section III.—22—
The other major factor suggested by the regression analysis as an
important cause of the recent decade's rise in divorce is the improvement
in contraceptive technology which began in the early 1960's. In terms of
a prognosis, the regression analysis can be interpreted in at least two
ways. If this phenomenon is strictly the diffusion of the oral—ITJD contra-
ception technology, working through the channels discussed in Section II,
one would expect at least a leveling off of the divorce rate soon, as that
technology is now surely effectively diffused in the U.S. (In the longer
run, this effect may lower divorce rates as many potential married couples
may choose not to marry and the remainder exhibit a lower rate of dissolu-
tion.) However, a second interpretation is also possible. Ifthe under-
lying phenomenon which the CT or DF variable reflects is an exogenous,
technologically induced shift toward costless, perfectly effective fer-
tility control, then the whole impact of this phenomenon may not lie behind
us. Significant post—pill innovations in sterilization, fetal monitoring
and perhaps abortion represent further advances toward perfect fertility
control, and may be expected to continue to exert upward pressure on the
observed divorce rate. Of course, the regression equation estimated here
more adequately reflects the first of these two interpretations, but the
logic of the argument need not.
As all the variables in the divorce regression in Section III are
lagged at least two years and the regression ends in 1974, the equation can
be used to predict the divorce rate for an-additional four years on the
basis of actual values for the explanatory variables. The actual divorce
rate and the predictions from eq. (3) in Table 4 for the last four years over












The equation implies a substantial reduction in the rate of increase in
the divorce rate over the "next" few years. The prediction for 1975 tracks
well the official 1975 divorce rate (which recently became available in
Nay 1977), and the flattening of the divorce series thereafter appears to
be consistent with the preliminary vital statistics figures on divorces
subsequently.FOOTNOTE S
1. See Becker (1974), Becker, Landes, Michael (1977), Preston, McDonald
(1976), and Ross, Sawhill (1975).
2. For example, in Becker, Landes, Michael (1977) a ten percent increase
in husband's earnings is associated with a reduction in the probabil-
ity of divorce in the first five years of marriage by about 0.2 per-
cent from a mean of 6.8 percent (the effect is nonlinear and appears
to persist through the first 25 years of marriage); Ross, Sawhill
(1975) find an additional $1000 of wives' annual earnings raises by
one percent (t =3.4)the probability of divorce in a four—year
period, holding husbands' earnings fixed; and for a positive assor—
tative trait such as religion, Michael (1976) finds that similarity
between spouses reduces the probability of divorce substantially.
3. One exception, perhaps, is the impact of an increase in the unem-
ployment rate. An increase in unemployment experienced by one man
may convey new information to him and his spouse about his labor
market prospects compared to others, and this information may be
maritally destabilizing.[Ross, Sawhill (1975, p. 56) find that an
extended period of unemployment is destabilizing.] An increase in
unemployment in the aggregate, however, may be viewed as a cyclical
phenomenon conveying no such information. Thus while unemployment
is positively related to the probability of divorce in cross—section
studies, that effect may be weaker in the aggregate data. In prin-
ciple, high unemployment could induce a postponement in divorce, as
it does the purchase of many durable goods and, apparently, births
and marriages [see Silver (1965)].
4. The IUD became a medically accepted and thus a generally available
contraceptive option in the U.S. only after Guttmacher's 1962 inter-
national conference on BiDs. See Huber, et. al. (1975).
5. See Michael, Willis (1976, pp. 36—39) for details and qualifications.
These probabilities are calculated as 1—Cl—p.)12° where p1 is the
estimated monthly probability of conception using technique i.
6. Of course, the direction, of causation is not altogether clear here if
fertility is affected by the anticipation of divorce. Becker, Landes,
Michael (1977) discuss this issue in detail and present evidence
suggesting that the causation between fertility and divorce flows in
both directions.
7. See Becker, Landes, Michael (1977) who use SEO data for white women.
Cherlin (1977) using NLS data for white women aged 30—44 also finds
that the presence of young (but not older) children tends to lower
the probability of marital separation.—F2-
8.It may be well to note and clear up an apparent inconsistency here.
Above it was suggested that unexpected events are maritally destabil-
izing per se while here the argument is made that the reduction in
uncertainty about subsequent fertility is destabilizing due to its
impact on intervening investment behavior. The former point pertains
to an unanticipated event ——achange in one's health, or labor market-
ability for example. The latter pertains to a recognized or antici-
pated uncertainty which affects behavior whether or not the event
actually occurs. The same distinction could be made regarding any
other stochastic event. Couples may marry with some anticipated risk
of the husband being unemployed sometime. No statement has been made
about the impact on divorce of a change in that anticipated risk.
What has been argued is that an unanticipated period of unemployment is
maritally destabilizing. In the case of the risk of conception, the
case is argued that a reduction in that risk is maritally destabilizing.
Moreover, to the extent the change in available contraceptive tech-
nology itself was an unanticipated event, it should be expected to be
maritally destabilizing per se.
9.A major remaining puzzle related to this point is the precipitous
rise in recent years in the rate of illegitimate births [see Hartley
(1975)1. Perhaps a substitution of abortion for contraception as a
means of fertility control may be a factor. That is, perhaps some
couples find a contraceptive strategy involving a hypothetical
abortion not as easy to implement once a pregnancy is detected (for
financial, emotional, religious or other reasons). Perhaps the rise
in divorce itself, which has resulted in an increase in the propor-
tion of children not raised by both their natural parents, has
resulted in a reduction in the social sanctions against illegitimacy.
10.Preston, McDonald (1976) use five separate income terms in their
analysis of cohort divorce and find a strong deterrent effect of
recent income and a strong destabilizing effect of income about 12
years prior to marriage.
11.Some information on the length of time between separation and
divorce is available for DRA states. In 1969 in California about 7%
of divorces took place in less than one year after separation while
about 14% took place after three or more years of separation; for
Michigan the comparable figures were 46% and 15% and for Virginia 3%
and 24% respectively [see Table 22, Platens (1973)]. Of course
the final decision to divorce may also be made some months after
separation has taken place.
12. If the relationship
Dt =a+ b Y_1 + c
exhibits autocorrelation, the Durbin procedure involves first
estimating
Dt =a'+ p Dtl + b'
—1+ b" 't—2 + e—F3—
and using p as an estimate of the first—order autoregressive parameter
in the second stage equation:
(Dt —PDi)
=a(1—p)+ b(Yi — ÷Ut.
13. For reference the figure also includes a time trend estimate obtained
by the regression in Dt =a+ bT (or Dt =AerT)in which
b =.01296(t=8.3);a =l.666(t=21.5)and R2 =.56.Divorce rates
for census years prior to 1920 are available and are substantially
lower than predicted by this constant growth rate of 1.3. When the
1890, 1900 and 1910 observations are included in the regression, the
growth rate is 1.5.
14. That is, if the fifty years were shifted back in time by as little as
two years, 1920—1970, military manpower's effect would have been
estimated as —1.0 percent due to the first World War, and marriage
duration's effect would have been 0.5 percent.
15. Statutory changes are a matter of record but changes in practice,
procedures or interpretation are far more difficult to identify or
evaluate. Platens [see Rheinstein (1972)] indexed the ease of
divorce by state for 1959, but to my knowledge no one has updated
Platens' work, much less provided a time series.
16. The married populations are estimates extrapolated from 1960 and 1970
censuses; the number of divorces are from Vital Statistics through
1972. The divorce numbers for 1973 and 1974 were kindly provided by
Alexander Platens' office at D.H.E.W.
17. In a study of the impact of the no—fault law in California, Schoen,
Greenblatt and Mielke reach the surprising conclusion that there is
"no basis for concluding that non—adversary divorce led to any
increase in marital dissolutions among Californians" (1975, p. 231).
They contend that nearly all the additional 1970—71 divorces resulted
from the timing feature of the law (six—month instead of twelve—
month minimum residency and required time between filing and decree),
with some additional Californians divorcing in their ownstate
instead of Nevada after the new law went into effect.
18. For example, in 1970 the divorce rate in California for first
marriages is estimated to be 22.1 while for second marriages it is
40.5. The reason for much of this difference is a vast difference in
the average duration of marriages, but even holding duration constant
one observes a sizable differential [see McCarthy (1977)].
19. The proportion of marriages which were second or higher order in 1950,
1960 and 1970 were 13.8, 13.0, 13.7 percent respectively, according
to the decennial censuses.
9APPENDIX
Appendix Table A—i indicates the sources of variables used in
Table 4 and in this appendix. Table A—2 is a simple correlation matrix
for 1920—1974 (below the diagonal in this table) and for 1950—1974 (above
the diagonal).
Table A—3 indicates several additional regressions which may be
compared to those in Table 4. The only additional variable is:
F: Fertility: live births per thousand women aged 15 to 44
(ji= 101.6;a =15.7;range 75. to 125.)
The ordinary first difference equations (eqs. 1—4) exhibited serious
serial correlation as did the level equations (not shown). Including
time in the first difference regression (eq. 2) affected nothing. In-
cluding fertility (eqs. 3 and 4), which suffers from simultaneity'problems,
weakens CT substantially.
In the first of the three modified first difference equations, REL(Y)
replaces Y (eq. 5) and performs no better than in eq.; (5) of Table 4.
Eq. (5) adds an income—squared term to eq. (1) of Table 4, but the co-
efficient is not significant. Eq. (8) is a slightly altered form of the
two—stage estimation procedure used in eq. (3) of Table 4, adding the
initial year observation as XTlp2, as discussed in Johnston (1972,
p. 261). As is consistent with the discussion in Johnston or Griliches,
Rao(1969),this modification had no substantive effect on the estimator.
1950—1974. Because of higher quality post—war data on several ex-
ogenous variables and the nature of the divorce series during the 1940's,
a separate regression analysis of the post—war period was done. The
analysis includes four additional variables:MEN(Y): Men's income: median real income of males age 14 and over;
I: Income: per capita personal income excluding transfer
payments, in 1967 dollars;
LF: Labor force participation rates: the LFPR of women with
spouse present and with children under six;
PA: Public assistance: average monthly AFDC payment per
recipient in 1967 dollars.
The means, standard deviations and ranges of the variables for this
shorter time period are:
Variable a Range
DR 11.5 3.1 8.9—19.3
Y 2316.0 398.0 1771.—3045.
MEN(Y) 4.7 0.8 3.3—5.9
U 4.8 1.1 2.9—6.8
GI 2.4 0.5 1.4—3.4
MD 20.9 2.5 18.1—25.4
CT 7.5 12.5 0—35.
F 108.0 12.0 86.—l23.
LF 20.1 6.2 10.8—30.3
PA 33.7 5.1 28.3—43.1
I 2.4 0.4 1.8—3.2
Table A—4 indicates the most useful results from this analysis, all in
modified first difference form. GI and MD were never significant in this
short time period. Neither PA, F, nor LF showed statistical significance
but there is considerable multicollinearity among these variables and
income. The use of men's income MEN(Y) in place of Y destroyed the sig—
nificance of the positive income effect.
j-A3-
Table A—i. Data Sources
DEFINITION
VARIABLE (see text) DATE SOURCE
DR Divorce Rate 1920—1974Vital Statistics of the United
(p. 14)* States, Volume III, annual issues
(U.S. Public Health Service)
Y Income* 1903—1928A Study of Saving in the U.S.,
(p. 14) Volume III (NBER)
1929—1963The National Income and Product
Accounts of the U.S., 1929—1965
• (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis)
1964—1974Survey of Current Business, July
Issues (U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis)
Income 1946—1974NBER Troll Data Bank (Survey of
(p. A—i) Current Business)
NEN(Y) Men'sIncome 1944—1974Current Population Reports,
(p. A—i) Series P—60, Nos. 35, 90, and
103 (U.S. Bureau of Census)
REL(Y) Reiativ Income 1920—19 74 (Same as Y)
(p. 14)
U Unemploent
(p. 14) 1918—1928Manpower in Economic Growth: The
American Record Since 1800 by
Stanley Lebergott (McGraw—Hill)
1929—1970Employment and Earnings, May
1972 (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics)
1971—1974Handbook of Labor Statistics and
Employment and Earnings (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics)
Marriage 1918—1967100 Years of Marriage and
Duration Divorce Statistics, United
(p. 14) States, 1867—1967, Table 1
(U.S. Public Health Service)
1968—1974Vital Statistics of the U.S.,
Volume III for various years
(U.S. Public Health Service)-A4-
Table A—i (continued)
GI Military 1918—1970Various Reports and unpublished
(p. 14)* data U.S. Department of Defense
1971—1974The Budget of the U.S. Government,




1915—1974Vital Statistics of the U.S.,
(p. A—i) Volume I, 1968 and annual issues
(U.S. Public Health Service)
CT Contraceptive 1915—1973CT for the period 1960—1970 is
Technology defined to be the annual estimate
(p. 14) of married women spouse present
using the pill or IUD, obtained
from Ryder (1972 Tables 2 and 8)
based on NSF data. For the
period prior to 1960 the series
is assumed to be zero; for the
period since 1970 the figures are
estimates derived by linking
Ryder's series to an oral contra-
ceptive series ("minimum percen-
tage of U.S. women 15—44 supplied
with oral contraceptives through
commercial channels") based on
annual sales figures and reported
in Piotrow et al (1974), and to an
IUD series on the number of IUD's
distributed in the U.S. reported
in Huber et al (1975).
DF Diffusion of 1915—1975So far as I am aware, there is no
Contraceptive estimated diffusion curve for
Technology contraceptive technology; a mcdi—
(p. 14) flcation of a diffusion curve
estimated by Bonus (1973) for
TV's has been used. Assimilating
the diverse and complex information
about contraceptive technology (es-
pecially the awareness of its re-
percussions on the variance of fer-
tility outcomes) seems a more com-
plicated process than purchasing
a TV, so the TV diffusion curve
has been flattened somewhat. The
index employed here reaches 50%
saturation in about 9 years and
99% saturation in 16 years. The




LF Women's labor 1948—1974Handbook of Labor Statistics,
force partici— 1972 and Special Labor Force
pation rate Reports (U.S. Bureau of Labor
(p. A—i)
Statistics)
PA Public 1936—1970Social Security Bulletin, Annual
Assistance Statistical Supplement, 1971 (U.S.
(p. A_l)* Social Security Administration)
1971—1974Public Assistance Statistics
(U.S. Social and Rehabilitation
Service)
*
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Barbara Andrews for conscientious research assistance.Over the past ten years the United States has witnessed a dramatic
rise in its aggregate divorce rate. After remaining relatively stable
for over forty years (except for two years in the Great Depression and
three years during World War II), in the latter half of the 1960's the
divorce rate began to rise precipitously and has continued that rise to
today. Table 1 indicates the pattern of the U.S. divorce rate since 1920.
This general pattern of increase in divorce in the past decade is
not unique to the United States. It is also evident in Canada, in many
European countries including United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Czechoslo—
vakia, USSR and to a lesser degree East and West Germany, as well as in
Australia and New Zealand. The rise is not, in general, found in middle—
Eastern, African, Latin or South American, or Asian countries.
The demographic literature has informally suggested numerous possible
causes of this increase in divorce in the U.S., but empirical evidence on
the Importance of contributing factors has not appeared. Often cited
causes such as the liberalization of divorce laws, the impact of the War
in Vietnam and the rise in women's labor force participation rates cannot
help explain the quite similarly timed burst in the divorce rates in many
other countries. The rise In divorce may, in fact, prove to be a difficult
phenomenon to explain, so more extensive and systematic research on its
nature and its causes appears warranted.
To begin to understand the causes of the recent upswing in divorce,
several research approaches seem feasible. First, some historical per-
spective should prove useful and Glick and Norton (1973) provide per-
spective with retrospective information from the 1971 CPS, focusing on
cohort divorce behavior. Likewise, a recent multivariate analysis of—2—
cohort divorce over the past century by Preston and McDonald (1976)
provides perspective, although the Preston—McDonald study itself ends with
1969. A second approach is a multivariate analysis of the recent time
series divorce rate itself, and studies of this nature are currently
underway (e.g. Michael, 1977). A third approach, which this short paper
employs, is a decomposition of the recent increase in order to see its
anatomy more clearly. By knowing more about which groups, social or
demographic, have contributed most to the increase, we should be in a
better position to understand the reasons for the recent change. The
difficulty with this approach is the sparcity of information about char-
acteristics of those divorcing. This paper uses available information
from Vital Statistics on women's age at the time of divorce together
with information from the U.S. decennial censuses. With this information
the change in divorce over the past fifteen years is decomposed into age— )
specificdivorce rates and age—specific marriage weights that are affected
by changes in age structure and in age at first marriage.
These age—specific divorce rates permit us to address two types of
questions: (1) What is the anatomy of the rise in the aggregate divorce
rate since 1960? Is the rise due to a shift in the age structure of the
married population toward ages which traditionally have higher divorce
rates? Is the rise due to a roughly equal proportionate rise in the age—
specific divorce rates or is it attributable to a disproportionate rise in
the divorce rate for a few age groups? (2) Is the time pattern of the rise
in the aggregate divorce rate (i.e. a low growth rate from 1960 to 1965
andahigh growth rate from 1965 to 1970 and from 1970 to 1975) mirrored
in all of the age—specific divorce rates?—3—
To address the first set of questions a decomposition of the
divorce rate into age—specific population weights, marriage proportions
and divorce rates can be performed. Let
- th
D.t =thenumber of divorces in the Iage group in year t;
Mit
=thenumber of married women In the th age group in year t;
=thenumberofwomeninthe Iage group in year c.
The divorce rate at timet isdefined as:
D D M IDM P.M\
(1) DR ix 1000 =E x 1000 =E(-—----—x 1000
tMt M Mt iMj "inj
= E
(die m. m)
where d, m and p are the group's divorce rate, marriage proportion and
population weight respectively. These quantities are calculated for
eight age groups defined as i 19, 20—24, 25—29, 30—34, 35—39, 40—44,
45—49, and50, for several years.
The Vital Statistics data used are from the Divorce Registration
Area (DRA), which reports divorces by age, but the DRA was only begun in
1958 with 16 states reporting. By 1971 there were 29 states in the DRA,
but not all recorded age at decree. I selected for study all states (15)
which were In the DRA by 1960 with a preponderance of reported divorces
distributed by age at decree. (Divorces not distributed were apportioned
by age in the same proportions as those reported for each state separately.)
The set of states included Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. Published data are available for these states through
1973, and data for 1974 were kindly provided me by Alexander Platens' office.—4—
The 1960 and 1970 censuses provide information on the number of
married women by age in each state, so age and state specific divorce
rates for 1960 and 1970 were obtained using the annual divorce flows from
Vital Statistics (the DRA) and the annual stocks of women at risk from the
censuses. As the flow of divorces is an annual series, divorce rates for
1965 and 1974 are also estimated but these are based on straight line
extrapolations of the stocks of married women based on the 1960 and 1970
census figures. Thus, the rates estimated for the mid—decade years are
subject to greater error and will be treated accordingly.
This set of fifteen states exhibited a somewhat lower level of
divorce than the U.S. as a whole, but the &rowth in divorce rates is very
similar to the growth for the U.S., as seen from Table 2.So from the
point of view of the changes over time, this fifteen—state sample appears
to be representative df the U.S. as a whole. )
Equation(1) can be used to construct synthetic divorce rates re-
flecting what the divorce rate would have been under various assumptions
about changes in the d's, m's and p's. Table 3 shows several of these
synthetic divorce rates) If the population's age structure shifted
between 1960 and 1970 as in fact it did, but no change had taken place in
the age—specific proportions married or in the age—specific divorce rates,
the aggregate divorce rate in 1970 would have fallen by 1.2 percent from
1960 to the level 7.54. If the population's age structure and marriage
proportions shifted between 1960 and 1970 as in fact they did, but the age—
specific divorce rates had remained unchanged, the aggregate divorce rate
in 1970 would have been 8.24, some 8 percent higher than in 1960. However,
if the age—specific divorce rates shifted, as in fact they did, while the—5—
marriage proportions and population weights had been unchanged, the 1970
divorce rate would have been 12.21, practically identical with the actual
1970 divorce rate. So, had the age composition of the married population
been unchanged between 1960 and 1970, the aggregate divorce rate would still
have risen by about sixty percent over the decade.2
Table 4 addresses the same issue somewhat differently, showing each
age category's contribution to the decade growth in the divorce rate from
7.6 to 12.2. Col. (7) again indi:ates that a very large portion of the
growth in divorce over the decade is attributable to changes in age—specific
divorce rates. The final column indicates that over sixty percent of the
decade growth is attributable to women in the 20's (i.e. 33.9, +26.9),
despite the fact that these women represent only about twenty percent of
the married population. tSee Cols. (3) and (4).] The substantially greater
contribution of women in their 20's than of women in their 30's results from
the relative growth in the marriage weight of the former (a combined con-
tribution of 21.2 percent) compared to the relative reduction in the
marriage weight of the latter (a combined contribution of —7.0 percent).
So, Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the decade's rise in divorce is
surely not due to a shift in the age structure of the married population,
nor is it the result of a proportionate rise in the divorce rates at all
ages. In fact, the divorce rate rose far more rapidly for women in their
20's and early 30's. The shift in age structure of the married population
further increased the impact of the growth in young women's divorce rates.
Turning to the question of the time pattern of the growth in divorce
rates, Table 5 provides an answer. The more rapid rate of increase in the
second half of the 1960's is mirrored in the age—specific rates for women in—6—
their 20's and 30's, but not so for women over age 40. In fact, for women
over age 40 the per annum growth rate in divorce was higher in the first
half of the 1960's than in the second half. So in this regard, as well as
in the decomposition shown in Table 4, the burst in divorce in the late
1960's is attributable to wonn in their 20's and 30's. The sustained
rise in the early 1970's also appears to be caused by younger women.3
The decade changes shown in column (4) again reflect this differential
growth in divorces among younger women. The fourteen year change shown in
column (5) confirms this tendency.
These tables provide a valuable clue to the explanation of the rise
in divorce rates in recent years. Both the higher decade growth rate for
younger women and the within—decade pattern of that growth imply that the
explanation lies with forces which have influenced younger couples, not with
forces which influence all ages similarly. So in order to argue convincingly
that forces such as the easing of divorce laws or improved labor market
opportunities for women have caused the rise in divorce in the U.S., one
must explain why that force should have a greater impact on younger couples.
One final note. The sustained disproportionate growth in the divorce
rate for younger couples implies a substantial change since 1960 in the
divorce probability density function by age. In 1960 the age—specific
divorce rate for women aged 45—49, for example, was about 40 percent as
high as for women aged 25—29; by 1974 it was only 25 percent as high. So
not only has the risk of divorce increased dramatically over the past
decade and a half, the relative risk at young ages has also risen consid-
erably. It may be that we will find that much of the postponement in
fertility among young couples over the past decade is in fact related to
this shift in the relative likelihood of divorce at younger ages.—6 A-
Table 1: U.S. divorce rate for selected years. (Annual










Source: U.S. Vital Statistics
Table 2: Comparison of levels and growth rates of divorce
rates for the fifteen state sample and the U.S. total
Fifteen state
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DR11970 if p's changed
but d's and m's
did not change:7.54 —1.2%
If . , DR
1970if p s and m s
changed but d's
did not cha:ige: 8.24 8.0
DR'970 if d's changed
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did not change: 12.21 60.0






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5: Per annum growth rates of age—specific divorce rates, for
specified time intervals (fifteen—state sample).
Time Interval
Age
Group 1960—19651965—19701970—1974 1960—1970 1960—1974
19 0.4 2.2 11.0 1.3 4.1
20—24 4.4 7.6 4.2 6.0 4.8
25—29 6.1 6.8 10.1 6.5 7.5
30—34 2.1 9.0 12.6 5.5 7.6
35—39 2.9 6.2 9.2 4.6 5.9
40—44 4.2 3.9 4.7 4.0 4.2
45—49 5.4 2.8 5.2 4.1 4.5
￿ 50 2.8 2.5 6.3 2.6 3.6
Total 3.2 6.3 7.8 4.7 5.6
U.S. Total 2.8 6.8 6.5 4.8 5.3
DFOOTNOTES
1. The synthetic divorce rates in Table 3 are computed as a weighted
average across each of the fifteen states separately. When computed






2. One might wonder how the 60 percent actual rise is reconciled with an
8 percent rise due to a change in weights and a 60 percent rise due to
a change in age—specific rates. The two iihply a negative covariance.
If x =Eaband dx =E[a(db)+ (da)b + (da)(db)], then in this case the
dx =60.2,Ea(db) =8.0,E(da)b =60.0,so E(da)(db) must equal —7.8
(=60.2 —8.0—60.0).
3. These per annum growth rates maybemisleading in this regard. For
womenaged20—24, for example, the divorce rate rose 5.7 points in
these four years from 31.1 to 36.8 (a per annum growth rate of 4.2)
while for women over age 50, the divorce rate rose 0.8 points from
2.6 to 3.4 (a per annumgrowthrate of 6.3). Of the total growth
in the divorce rate from 1970 to 1974 the percentage attributable to
the change in the eight age—specific divorce rates were as follows:
7.2, 12.0, 25.7, 21.9, 11.2, 4.3, 3.4 and 4.8 for a total of 90.4
percent of the total four—year growth.
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